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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Allen Wayne Gillespie attempts to appeal from the district court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction and executing without reduction the unified sentence of
seven years, with three years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to felony DUI.
Because Gillespie waived his right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief'
pursuant to a plea agreement, his appeal should be dismissed.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
While on supervised probation for a prior DUI conviction, Gillespie drove
while intoxicated and with a suspended driver's Iicense. 1 (PSI, pp.2, 11, 19.)
When officers attempted to detain him, Gillespie physically resisted, "exposed
his buttocks to the officers," and '''[m]ade himself vomit.'"

(PSI, p.2.) He was

eventually transported to the police department, where "he continued to be
noncompliant," "threatened to urinate in the office," and spat at an officer. (PSI,
p.2.) After two unsuccessful attempts to obtain a breath sample, Gillespie finally
cooperated with the breathalyzer test and blew a .130/.136. (PSI, p.2.)
The state charged Gillespie with felony DUI (two prior DUI convictions
within 10 years) and three misdemeanors: DWP, assault, and resisting and/or
obstructing officers.

Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea

(R., pp.26-29.)

1 The presentence investigator wrote that Gillespie committed the DUI that is the
subject of this appeal five days after being released from misdemeanor
probation. (PSI, p.19.) This appears to be a misstatement, as the PSI otherwise
reflects that Gillespie did not complete his misdemeanor probation until March
30, 2011, and he committed the instant offense on March 4, 2011. (PSI, pp.2,
11,19.)

1

agreement, Gillespie pled guilty as charged and the parties stipulated that
Gillespie "shall be sentenced to 36 months fixed and 48 months indeterminate,
with credit for time served and the court to retain Jurisdiction and recommend
placement in the CAPP program during the retained jurisdiction." (R., pp.18-20.)
The parties also agreed that if Gillespie "successfully completes the retained
jurisdiction the court shall suspend the execution of the sentence and place
[Gillespie] on supervised probation for a period of four (4) years." (R., p.19.)
The plea agreement also contained the following appeal waiver provision: "The
Defendant waives appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief."

(R., p.19.)

Gillespie and his attorney both signed the agreement and, in so doing,
specifically represented that Gillespie "understands this agreement and by his
signature agrees to the terms of the agreement." (R., p.20.)
The district court accepted Gillespie's pleas and, consistent with the plea
agreement, imposed a unified sentence of seven years with three years fixed for
the felony DUI.
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(R., pp.46-47.) Also consistent with the agreement, the court

retained jurisdiction and specifically recommended that Gillespie be placed in the
CAPP program. (R., p.46.) Ultimately, the department of correction determined
that Gillespie was ineligible for placement in the CAPP program and placed him
instead in the Therapeutic Community (TC) program.

(R., pp.57-58; see also

APSI, p.2.) Gillespie did not perform well in the TC program and, less than six
months into the "9 to 12 month program," TC staff recommended that the court

The court imposed concurrent jail sentences for each of the misdemeanors to
which Gillespie pled guilty. (6/10/11 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.17, L.7.) Gillespie does
not challenge those sentences on appeal.
2

2

relinquish jurisdiction.

(APSI cover and pp.1-3.)

The court followed the

recommendation, relinquished jurisdiction and ordered Gillespie's sentence
executed without reduction. (R., pp.86-88.)
Gillespie filed a notice of appeal within 42 days of the court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.1 09-13.)
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ISSUES
Gillespie states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction over Mr. Gillespie, or alternatively, by not reducing his
sentence sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so.
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Should Gillespie's appeal be dismissed because, as part of the stipulated
plea agreement, Gillespie waived his right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 relief?"

2.

Alternatively, has Gillespie failed to establish that the district court abused
its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering his sentence
executed without reduction?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
Gillespie's Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because He Knowingly And Voluntarily
Waived His Right To Appeal Pursuant To The Plea Agreement

A.

Introduction
Gillespie

argues that the

district court abused

its discretion

by

relinquishing jurisdiction and executing without reduction the unified sentence of
seven years with three years fixed imposed upon his guilty plea to felony DUI.
(Appellant's brief, pp.9-16.) Gillespie's appeal should be dismissed because, as
part of the stipulated plea agreement, he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.)

B.

Standard Of Review
"A plea agreement is contractual in nature, must be measured by contract

law standards, and as a question of law, [the appellate court] exercises free
review." State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492,495,129 P.3d 1241, 1244 (2006) (citing
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50,63,106 P.3d 376, 389 (2004)). Where the waiver
of the right to appeal is entered as part of a plea agreement, the appellate court
"employ[s] the same analysis as [it] would in determining the validity of any plea
of guilty."

State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994),

quoted in Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245.

C.

Gillespie Knowingly And Voluntarily Waived The Right To Appeal The
District Court's Rulings
The right of a criminal defendant to appeal matters relating to his

conviction and/or sentence is a statutory right that may be waived.
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State v.

Cope, 142 Idaho 492,496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245 (2006); State v. Murphy, 125
Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994) (citing I.C. § 19-2801). When the
waiver of the right to appeal is included as a term of a plea agreement, such
waiver is enforceable as long as the record shows that it was voluntarily,
knowingly, and inte"igently made. Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245;
Murphy, 125 Idaho at 456, 872 P.2d at 719; State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482,
484,943 P.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997).
Gi"espie acknowledges the appeal waiver provision of his plea agreement
but contends the "waiver does not bar the present appeal" because, he argues,
the waiver only extends to his right to appeal from the judgment and sentence,
not to the court's order relinquishing jurisdiction.

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.)

Alternatively, he argues the appeal waiver is ambiguous and, as such, must be
interpreted in his favor to permit the present appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.)
Neither of Gi"espie's arguments have merit.
The stipulated plea agreement is unambiguous.

In exchange for

Gillespie's plea of guilty to felony DUI and three misdemeanors (DWP, assault
and resisting and obstructing police officers), the parties agreed that Gillespie
would be sentenced to a unified term of seven years, with three years fixed, with
the court retaining jurisdiction and recommending Gi"espie's placement in the
CAPP program.

(R., pp.18-19.)

Gi"espie stipulated to the imposition of that

sentence and specifically agreed to "waive[] appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35
relief." (R., p.19.) Gillespie and his attorney both signed the agreement and, in
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so doing, acknowledged that Gillespie understood the agreement and agreed to
its terms. (R., p.20.)
Pursuant to the plain language of the plea agreement, Gillespie waived,
without any express or implied limitation, his right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 relief."

(R., p.19.) Although Gillespie's appellate counsel apparently

believes that the scope of Gillespie's appeal waiver did not include a waiver of
the right to appeal the district court's ultimate decision, made after judgment, to
relinquish jurisdiction and order Gillespie's sentence executed without reduction,
neither the plain language of the appeal waiver provision nor the applicable law
supports that position.
Thi$ is not a case, like State v. Holdaway, 130 Idaho 482, 484, 943 P.2d
72, 74 (Ct. App. 1997), where the defendant agreed to a limited waiver of the
right to appeal only from the "judgment and sentence."

To the contrary, the

appeal waiver provision of the plea agreement in this case is extremely broad
and includes an unlimited waiver of the right to "appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule
35 relief." (R., p.19.) Gillespie was aware when he executed the agreement and
entered his pleas that the district court would be retaining jurisdiction. (See R.,
p.19.) He was also aware that the court would only be required to place him on
probation if he "successfully complete[d] the retained jurisdiction."

(Id.)

Had

Gillespie wished to retain the right to appeal the district court's ultimate
determination whether to place him on probation following the period of retained
jurisdiction he could easily have done so by requiring the state to include such
provision in the written plea agreement. Gillespie did not do so, however, and
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agreed instead to plead guilty and waive, without limitation, his appellate rights
and right to Rule 35 relief. (R., p.19.)
That the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction is itself an
appealable order under Idaho's appellate rules does not support Gillespie's
position that he has the right in this case to appeal from that order.

(See

Appellant's brief, p.7 (citing, inter alia, Rules 11 (c)(9) and 14, I.A.R., for
proposition that "Gillespie may appeal a decision to relinquish jurisdiction of
right").)

As previously discussed, the right of a criminal defendant to appeal

matters pertaining to his or her conviction and sentence is a statutory right that
may be waived. Cope, 142 Idaho at 496, 129 P.3d at 1245; Murphy, 125 Idaho
at 457, 872 P.2d at 720.

Moreover, the meaning and scope of the appeal

waiver, like other provisions of the plea agreement, is dictated by the language of
See,~,

the agreement itself, not by the appellate rules.

State v. Person, 145

Idaho 293, 298, 178 P.3d 658, 663 (Ct. App. 2007) (examining language of plea
agreement to determine its meaning). Pursuant to the unambiguous language of
the plea agreement in this case, Gillespie waived, without limitation, his right to
"appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief."

Because Gillespie executed an

unlimited waiver of his appellate rights and right to Rule 35 relief, his appeal from
the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and ordering his sentence
executed without reduction should be dismissed. 3

3 Even if this Court concludes that the term "waives appeal," as it is used in the
plea agreement, is ambiguous as it pertains to Gillespie's ability to appeal the
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, there is nothing ambiguous about
Gillespie's waiver of "Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) Regardless of
the propriety of Gillespie's appellate challenge to the court's decision to
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II.
Alternatively, Gillespie Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused
Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Gillespie

argues that the

district court

abused

its

discretion

by

relinquishing jurisdiction without giving sufficient consideration to several factors
that he claims are mitigating, including his traumatic childhood, mental condition,
acceptance of responsibility, family support and the efforts he made while in the
retained jurisdiction program.

(Appellant's brief, pp.9-15.)

Citing the same

factors, he also contends that the district court abused its discretion by not sua

sponte reducing his sentence when it relinquished jurisdiction. (Appellant's brief,
pp.15-16.) Even if this Court considers the merits of Gillespie's appellate claims,
Gillespie has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v.

Moore, 131 Idaho 814,823,965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland,
125 Idaho 499,873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In
Relinquishing Jurisdiction
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse

relinquish jurisdiction, Gillespie's claim on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion by not "reducing his sentence sua sponte pursuant to Rule 35" is in
direct contravention of his express waiver of Rule 35 relief and, as such, is not
properly before this Court.
9

of that discretion.

See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10

(1981); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App.
1990). A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521.
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984).
Contrary to Gillespie's assertions on appeal, a review of the record in this case
supports the district court's determination that Gillespie was not a suitable
candidate for probation, particularly in light of his extensive criminal record, his
failures to take advantage of rehabilitative opportunities and his

poor

performance during the period of retained jurisdiction.
Thirty-eight-year-old Gillespie has a 20-year history of violating the law.
His criminal record occupies more than eight pages of the PSI and includes 34
misdemeanor and five felony convictions. (PSI, ppA-11, 18.) His conviction in
this case represents his second felony DUI conviction and his fifth DUI conviction
overall. (PSI, ppA-11.) The majority of his other convictions also appear to be
for alcohol and driving related offenses - e.g., minor in possession (amended
from DUI), unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, "driving with spirit, liquor in
body," no auto insurance (three convictions), reckless driving, driving on a
suspended license (10 convictions), open container, pedestrian under the
influence, failure to purchase driver's license (amended from DWP), and unsafe
operation of a vehicle (amended from inattentive/careless driving). (PSI, ppA11.) He has also been convicted of numerous property crimes and crimes of
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violence, including assault, resisting arrest, criminal damage (three convictions),
endangerment, criminal damage per domestic violence, and disorderly conduct
per domestic violence. (PSI, pp.7-11.)
As a result of his prior convictions, Gillespie has been afforded multiple
opportunities for probation.

(PSI, pp.4-13.)

He appears to have completed

some of those probationary periods without incident, but violated others by
committing new crimes, consuming alcohol and using illegal substances,
including marijuana, cocaine and methamphetamine. (Id.) He has served three
prison terms (PSI, pp.12-13) and has also participated in at least three
substance abuse treatment programs, including staying for approximately six
months at what appears to be a residential treatment facility (PSI, p.18). Prior
sanctions and treatment opportunities have not assisted Gillespie in overcoming
his substance abuse issues nor deterred him from committing new crimes.
Gillespie himself admits that, when he is not on probation, he reverts to
consuming alcohol and, he states, "It's like I just got out of trouble, and then I get
in trouble again."

(PSI, p.17.)

Even that admission does not appear to be

entirely forthcoming, as the PSI indicates Gillespie has consumed alcohol and
illegal substances even while on probation (PSI, 12-13, 17) and, in fact, was on
misdemeanor probation when he committed the felony DUI of which he was
convicted in this case (PSI, pp.2, 11, 19).
Despite Gillespie's demonstrated unwillingness or inability to abstain from
alcohol and illegal substances and to otherwise conform his behavior to the
requirements of the law, the district court, in an exercise of leniency, followed the
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plea agreement and retained jurisdiction to afford Gillespie yet another
opportunity to prove his amenability to community supervision.

(R., pp.46-47;

6/10/11 Tr., p.11, L.22 - p.12 L.5, p.13, Ls. 7-11.) Gillespie utterly failed to take
advantage of that opportunity, however, as he failed to complete two of the three
programs in which he was enrolled, including the core Therapeutic Community
(TC) program which is specifically "designed and structured to create an
environment for social learning and change" and includes "intense drug and
alcohol treatment." (APSI, p.1.)
According to TC staff, Gillespie "started his TC programming with an air of
arrogance," "seemed surly and insolent," and "demonstrated no desire to follow
the rules."

(APSI, p.2.)

He received a written warning for violating program

rules, was "pulled up a significant number of times for his negative behavior"
and, despite numerous interventions by staff and other program participants,
displayed neither interest nor motivation "to invest time and energy in his TC
programming in order for him to change to become a productive member of
society."

(APSI, pp.2-4; APSI Discharge Summary, pp.1, 3.)

TC staff

recognized Gillespie's minimal accomplishments during the program but noted
that, "[o]verall, there has been little significant change in Mr. Gillespie" as a result
of his programming. (APSI Discharge Summary, pp.1-2.) Ultimately, the staff
concluded that Gillespie "remain[ed] a high-risk for reoffending within the
community" and, as such, was not an appropriate candidate for probation.
(APSI, p.4)

In light of this information, the district court acted well within its

discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction.
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In arguing an abuse of discretion Gillespie cites a number of mitigating
factors that he claims militate against the district court's decision to relinquish
jurisdiction.

(Appellant's brief, pp.11-15.)

While it is undoubtedly true, as

asserted by Gillespie, that he had a traumatic childhood, that he suffers from
depression and dyslexia, that he purported to accept responsibility for his actions
that led to his convictions in this case, and that he is supported by his family,
these considerations in no way diminish the district court's conclusion that
Gillespie would not be successful on probation.

Gillespie has a history of

drinking and driving and was deemed to pose a high risk of reoffense.

(PSI,

p.19; APSI, p.4.) His programming during the retained jurisdiction period did not
reduce that risk.

Considering all the evidence, and giving deference to the

district court's ability to weigh that evidence,

Gillespie has failed to show an

abuse of discretion.

D.

Gillespie Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Sentence Upon Relinquishing
Jurisdiction
Upon relinquishing jurisdiction, a court may order the original sentence

executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
I.C.R. 35. A court's decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion subject to the well-established standards governing whether a
sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct.
App. 2009). Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104
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P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978).
Citing the same factors he claims militated against the relinquishment of
jurisdiction, Gillespie argues that the district court abused its discretion by not
sua sponte reducing the unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed,

imposed upon his conviction for felony DUI. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-16.) For
the reasons already set forth in section II.C., supra, and incorporated herein by
reference, Gillespie has failed to show that he was entitled to a reduction of his
sentence. Gillespie has failed to show an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that Gillespie's appeal be dismissed.
Alternatively, the state requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
relinquishing jurisdiction and executing without reduction the sentence imposed
upon Gillespie's guilty plea to felony DUI.
DATED this 9th day of November 2012.

LORI A. FLEMING

14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of November 2012, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appel/ate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

-0

RI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
LAF/pm

15

